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Abstract According to Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument, Mary, a
brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with com-
plete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal experience.
This claim about knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that
the knowledge argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the
relevant experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the
truth of physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles have been removed, Mary can know
the relevant truths. If we give Mary the epistemological capabilities necessary to
draw metaphysical conclusions about physicalism, she will, while trapped in the
black and white room, be able to know every truth about phenomenal experience.
Keywords Concepts  Concept possession  Conceptual mastery  Knowledge
argument  Phenomenal concept  Physicalism  Phenomenal concept strategy 
Dualism  Modal rationalism  Consciousness  Phenomenal experience
1 Introduction
According to Frank Jackson’s famous knowledge argument (Jackson 1982, 1986),
Mary, a brilliant neuroscientist raised in a black and white room and bestowed with
complete physical knowledge, cannot know certain truths about phenomenal
experience. For example, she can’t know what it’s like to see red. This claim about
knowledge, in turn, implies that physicalism is false. I argue that the knowledge
argument founders on a dilemma. Either (i) Mary cannot know the relevant
experiential truths because of trivial obstacles that have no bearing on the truth of
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physicalism or (ii) once the obstacles have been removed, Mary can know the relevant
truths. If we give Mary the epistemological capabilities necessary to draw
metaphysical conclusions about physicalism, she will, while trapped in the black
and white room, be able to know every truth about phenomenal experience.1
2 Physicalism
Physicalism requires, at the least, that the physical state of our world necessitates
the complete state of our world. The knowledge argument purports to refute this
supervenience claim. We operationalize physicalism as follows:
Physicalism =def Every austerely physical duplicate of the actual world is a
duplicate simpliciter.2
An austerely physical duplicate of the actual world is a metaphysically possible world
at which every austerely physical propositions true at the actual world is true. A
duplicate simpliciter of the actual world is a world at which every proposition true at
the actual world is true. An austerely physical proposition (or physical proposition) is
a proposition composed of concepts taken only from physics, mathematics, and logic,
or which is expressible using only vocabulary taken from physics, mathematics, and
logic. A truth or fact is a true proposition. I assume a fine-grained, roughly Fregean
treatment of propositions.3 On this approach, the proposition expressed by ‘Hesperus
is bright’ is not the same proposition expressed by ‘Phosphorous is bright’. Concepts
compose propositions in a manner similar to that by which words compose sentences.
3 The knowledge argument
Here’s our quick and dirty starting version of the knowledge argument.
(1) Knowledge of all the austerely physical information does not put one in a
position to know all the information.
(2) If (1), then physicalism is false.
(3) Therefore, physicalism is false.
1 Phenomenal experiences are associated with raw experiences or sensations. Some examples include the
sensation associated with a pain, the color-experience associated with seeing the sky (a ‘‘blue
experience’’), or the sensation one has when the back of one’s neck itches. In the words of Nagel (1974),
there is something ‘‘it is like’’ for the subject of a phenomenal experience. I use the terms ‘phenomenal’
and ‘experiential’ interchangeably.
2 This definition is equivalent both to (i) the truth of every proposition supervenes on the truth of the
austerely physical propositions and to (ii) the true austerely physical propositions necessitate every true
proposition.
3 This assumption is dialectically fair—it helps the knowledge argument, which I plan to argue against.
For example, this assumption makes it much more difficult to launch the ‘‘same proposition, different
mode of presentation’’ defense against the knowledge argument (cf. Byrne (2002), Tye (1995)). I’ll argue
that Mary can know the relevant propositions, even on a fine-grained approach.
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The argument is clearly valid. But is it sound? Neither premise is obvious; both
have been coherently denied by physicalists.4 Support for premise (2) comes from
theorizing about modality. Support for premise (1) comes from Jackson’s (1982,
1986) famous thought experiment involving Mary.
Jackson asks us to envision Mary, a ‘‘brilliant neuroscientist who is... forced to
investigate the world from a black and white room via a black and white television
monitor. She... acquires... all the physical information there is to obtain about what
goes one when we see ripe tomatoes, or the sky, and use terms like ‘red’, ‘blue’, and
so on.’’ Mary has complete physical information, i.e. she knows every austerely
physical proposition, and every proposition that such knowledge places one in a
position to know. Jackson asks whether Mary learns anything new when she
emerges from the black and white room and sees a ripe red tomato for the first time.
He concludes that ‘‘it just seems obvious that she will learn something about the
world and our visual experience of it.’’ Therefore, knowledge of all the austerely
physical information does not put one in a position to know all the information—i.e.
premise (1) is true.5
Premise (2) gets support from the desire to avoid mysterious unexplained brute
necessities and from modal rationalism, according to which there are important
(potentially constitutive) connections between modality and epistemological notions
like ‘‘in a position to know’’, ‘‘a priori’’, and ‘‘conceptual truth’’.6 The general
physicalist idea that ‘‘all information is physical information’’, knowable on the
basis of complete austerely physical information, also supports premise (2).
4 The missing concept reply
The knowledge argument relies on a specific type of inference—an inference from
an epistemic gap, the lack of knowability of a target set of propositions on the basis
of a base set, to a metaphysical gap, the lack of necessitation from the base set to the
target proposition(s). In the knowledge argument, the base set is the set P of all true
austerely physical propositions. The target set contains, at the minimum, one
proposition about phenomenal experience.
The knowledge argument, as stated, does not stand a chance. It is a mistake to
conclude that a base set of propositions does not necessitate a target proposition
from the fact that someone who knows the base propositions is not in a position to
know the target. An agent might know the base propositions but not be in a position
to even possess the concepts in the target proposition. As a result, the agent won’t be
in a position to know the target propositions—because he or she can’t even consider
them! But an epistemic gap of this nature shows nothing about necessitation. The
following example demonstrates why. Imagine that Mary’s sister Jane knows all the
4 Premise (1) has been denied by so-called ‘‘type-A’’ physicalists, premise (2) by so-called ‘‘type-B’’
physicalists. This terminology originates in Chalmers (2003).
5 Enthymematic here is the claim that if Mary can’t know, no one can.
6 Jackson (1998) is the most sustained argument to date for modal rationalism. Cf. also Chalmers
(forthcoming), Chalmers and Jackson (2001), Lewis (2002), Levine and Trogdon (2009), and Schwarz
(2007).
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information in P , all the information about gender, and all the information about
who is married to whom. But Jane does not possess, and is not in a position to
possess, the concept BACHELOR.7 Jane knows that Ursula is a woman. But she does
not know, and is not in a position to know, that Ursula is not a bachelor. If we infer
from this epistemological gap to a metaphysical gap, we’ll conclude that the fact
that Ursula is a woman does not necessitate that she is not a bachelor. But clearly
this is false. Ursula’s being a woman does necessitate that she is not a bachelor.
The lesson is that if we’re going to infer from an epistemic gap between two
propositions (or sets of propositions) to a lack of necessitation, and we test for the
epistemic gap by checking what hypothetical agents could come to know, we must
require that these agents possess the concepts in the target proposition, or at least are
in a position to possess them.8,9 The fact that Jane, who does not possess the concept
BACHELOR, can’t know that Ursula is not a bachelor despite knowing that Ursula is a
woman, shows nothing about a lack of necessitation between the two propositions.
In the case of Mary, it is plausible that Mary does not possess the relevant
experiential concepts. For example, consider the concept REDexp. REDexp is the
phenomenal, experiential, concept of red. It is the concept tied to looking like this
(where a red patch is demonstrated), not the concept tied to light of wave-length 700
nanometers, or to surfaces that reflect light of that wave-length. Tomatoes, fire trucks,
and strawberries are red, but they cause redexp sensations.
10 The fact that Mary has
never had a redexp experience, cannot imagine a redexp sensation, and could not
recognize a redexp sensation as redexp were she to have one, supports the claim that
Mary does not possess the concept. With the ‘‘concept possession requirement’’ in
place, the physicalist has an easy reply to the knowledge argument—deny premise
(2). It is foolish to conclude, from the fact that Mary’s knowledge of base physical
propositions does not put her in a position to know target experiential propositions,
that the base does not necessitate the target. Because she does not possess the concepts
that compose the target propositions, Mary cannot consider them, let alone know
them. Only an inability to know, for an epistemic agent that possesses (or is in a
position to possess) all the concepts in the target propositions, has any hope of
yielding the desired metaphysical consequences.
5 Moving forward
Faced with the missing concept reply, the advocate of the knowledge argument must
either abandon the argument or modify the epistemological relationship used in it.11
7 I use small capitals to denote concepts, e.g. the concept BACHELOR.
8 In fact, I think that much more is required in terms of concept possession. Cf. Rabin (manuscript).
9 Byrne (2006), Hellie (2004, p. 348), Stoljar (2005, pp. 474–475), and Tye (2000, pp. 17–18) all make
similar points. They all note that one cannot draw any substantive conclusion from the Mary case if Mary
does not possess experiential concepts and cannot even consider the experiential propositions in question.
10 All tomatoes mentioned in this paper are ripe tomatoes with brilliant red skins.
11 The missing concept reply has appeared in the literature before (e.g. Hellie (2004), Loar (1990), Stoljar
(2005), and Tye (2000)).
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This epistemological relationship has two desiderata. First, its absence must be good
evidence for a lack of necessitation.12 Second, this epistemological relationship
must fail to hold between the austerely physical propositions P and certain
experiential propositions. Evidence for this failure will come from considering what
Mary can and cannot know.
I introduce a technical term, implication (verb form: implicate), to express an
epistemic relationship that might meet the desiderata. ‘Implicate’ allows us to
express the following schema for the knowledge argument:
(1) P does not implicate some proposition E about phenomenal experience.
(2) If P does not implicate E, then P does not necessitate E, and physicalism is
false.
(3) Therefore, physicalism is false.
Substituting for ‘implicate’ here yields different versions of the knowledge
argument. A candidate notion of implication meets the two desiderata above if and
only if it validates both premises. One upshot of this paper is that finding such a
conception of epistemological implication is difficult. All the candidates I consider
founder on one premise or the other. For example, in the previous section I argued
that any conception of implication according to which ‘B implicates T’ is equivalent
to (or even entails) ‘‘knowledge of B puts one in a position to know T’’ fails to
validate the second premise. One might not know because one does not possess the
concepts in T, but this shows nothing about either necessitation or physicalism.
However, that discussion yields an obvious suggestion for what implication might
be. Perhaps ‘B implicates T’ means that knowledge of B, given that one possesses
all concepts in T, puts one in a position to know T. In the next section, I argue that
this suggestion fails.
12 A question that may have occurred to the reader is whether we are ever justified in inferring from the
lack of knowability of a target proposition from a base set to the fact that the the base does not necessitate
the target. This issue becomes more pressing when one recognizes the obvious counterexamples. Even if
one possesses all the relevant concepts, knowing that there is water in the glass does not put one in a
position to know that there is H2O in the glass. Yet the fact that there is water in the glass does necessitate
that there is H2O in the glass. The worry can be addressed and the obvious counterexamples avoided. The
modal rationalist advocates of the general strategy of inferring from an epistemic to a metaphysical gap
(e.g. Jackson (1998), Chalmers (1996), Chalmers and Jackson (2001)) do not endorse the general claim
that, for any propositions B and T, if knowing B does not put one in a position to know T, B does not
necessitate T. The inference to a metaphysical gap is valid only for a special class of base propositions.
There is insufficient space for a full treatment here. One strategy is to require that, in order to draw
conclusions about necessitation from facts about epistemic implication, the base propositions must be
semantically neutral—i.e. not ‘‘twin-earthable’’. Famously, Putnam (1975) showed that ‘water’ is not
semantically neutral. It is plausible that the vocabulary of fundamental physics, the vocabulary in which
the austerely physical description P is written, is semantically neutral. Anything that acts like an electron
is an electron, whereas something can act like water and be XYZ, not water. Even if the fundamental
vocabulary of physics is not semantically neutral, this merely introduces an epicycle on the dialectic
(cf. Chalmers (1996, pp. 135–136)). Another important difference between the proposition that there is
water in the glass and the proposition P under consideration in the knowledge argument is that, according
to the physicalist, P necessitates all the facts—it leaves the truth value of no proposition unsettled. The
proposition that there is water in the glass has no such pretensions.
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6 The conceptual mastery reply
Some philosophers have pointed out that Mary, raised in her black and white room,
can possess the relevant experiential concepts.13 She can acquire them from her co-
workers, who have seen ripe red tomatoes and the big blue sky. Mary won’t have as
good a grasp of these concepts as her co-workers. After all, Mary has never
experienced redexp. But Mary will at least possess the relevant concepts and be able
to grasp propositions that contain them.14 However, it seems that Mary’s acquisition
of these concepts from her co-workers won’t help her learn the missing experiential
information. If so, then Mary can possess all concepts in the target experiential
propositions, know all the austerely physical propositions, and yet still not be in a
position to know the experiential propositions. The knowledge argument can
overcome the objection raised in the previous section and adapt to incorporate its
lesson, which is that the relevant epistemic agents must possess the concepts in the
target proposition.
In this section, I argue that we need additional constraints on implication. We
should not infer from ‘‘knowledge that B does not put someone who possesses all
the concepts in T in a position to know that T’’ to the fact that B does not necessitate
T. Possessing the concepts in T is not enough; we must require more of the
epistemic agent.
There are (at least) two different levels of understanding a concept. The first is
concept possession. If one is able to grasp propositions that contain the concept, or
think contents a component of which is the concept, then one possesses the concept.
Concept possession is easy to obtain. Burge’s (1979) Alfred possesses the concept
ARTHRITIS, but Alfred does not know what every doctor knows—that arthritis affects
joints, not limbs. Some of the doctors have a more sophisticated and demanding
relation to the concept ARTHRITIS—they have conceptual mastery. The proverbial
‘‘experts’’, to which laymen defer, often possess conceptual mastery. One can
possess a concept and still be grossly wrong about its extension, and even about
constitutive a priori truths regarding the concept. Conceptual mastery is less tolerant
of such errors.15
13 Ball (2009) and Tye (2009), among others, make this point.
14 A full defense of the claim that Mary can possess the relevant concepts in this way would take us too
far afield. It is certainly the consensus view in philosophical research on content. Here’s a brief argument
for the claim. If Mary thinks that the sky causes redexp sensations, her thought is wrong—the sky causes
blueexp sensations, not redexp ones. This is so because her thought has the same truth-conditions the
thought we would express with ‘the sky causes redexp sensations’ does. It has the same truth conditions
because it contains the same concepts, which contribute to the truth-conditions of the complete thought.
Mary’s concept has the same veridicality conditions our concept REDexp does. Therefore, Mary thinks with
the same REDexp concept the rest of us do. Here’s another brief argument: If Mary does not think with our
REDexp concept, she thinks with some other idiosyncratic concept (perhaps her REDexp concept is similar to
our BLUEexp concept). Interpreting her charitably, her idiosyncratic thought is most likely correct. But her
thought is not correct; she is wrong. Therefore she does not think with another concept.
15 The distinction between concept possession and conceptual mastery also appears in Greenberg
(manuscript, 2009) and Bealer (2002). Of course, the distinction has its roots in the seminal discussion of
Burge (1979). Mark Greenberg deserves credit for stressing to me the importance of the distinction and
the pitfalls into which philosophers can fall when they ignore or pay insufficient attention to it. In several
places (Ibid.), Greenberg uses an argumentative strategy similar to the one I adopt here. His use pre-dates
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Once we have distinguished these two levels of understanding a concept, we can
improve our grip on the connection between epistemic gaps and absence of
necessitation. We said above that when inferring from lack of implication to lack of
necessitation, only lack of knowability for agents who possesses all concepts in the
target proposition is relevant. We can do one better: only lack of knowability for
agents who have mastery of all concepts in the target proposition is relevant. The
following example demonstrates why.
Imagine again Mary’s sister Jane. By engaging with her co-workers, Jane comes to
possess the concept BACHELOR. She knows that Ulysses, who is married, is not a
bachelor, and that Achilles is a bachelor. But Jane is not a master of the concept
BACHELOR; she thinks unmarried women can be bachelors. Jane has complete
knowledge of P and knowledge of the gender and marital status of every person. Jane
knows that Ursula is a woman, and that Ursula is not married. Unlike the previous case,
because Jane now possesses the concept BACHELOR, she can consider the proposition
that Ursula is not a bachelor. But because of her erroneous view that women can be
bachelors, Jane will not come to know that Ursula is not a bachelor. If we don’t require,
in the inference from an epistemic to a metaphysical gap, that the relevant epistemic
agents have conceptual mastery (i.e. if mere concept possession is enough), then we
will be forced to conclude, on the basis of Jane’s inability to know that Ursula is not a
bachelor, that Ursula’s status as a female does not necessitate that she is not a bachelor.
But that conclusion is preposterous. Thus, we must require, if we are to infer from a
lack of implication to a corresponding lack of necessitation, that the epistemic agents
have mastery of all concepts in the target proposition(s).16
The conceptual mastery requirement offers a reply to the knowledge argument.17
Mary, despite coming to possess the concept REDexp via interaction with her co-
workers, does not have conceptual mastery. In order to have conceptual mastery of
REDexp, one must be able to identify a redexp sensation when experiencing one. One
might also maintain that conceptual mastery of REDexp requires that one have
experienced redexp and/or be able to imagine a redexp patch. Mary has never had a
redexp experience, is unable to imagine a redexp sensation, and cannot identify a
redexp experience as an instance of her concept REDexp. Therefore, she does not have
conceptual mastery of REDexp. As a result, Mary’s inability to know propositions
containing REDexp on the basis of the austerely physical information shows nothing
about necessitation. Only if such an epistemic gap occurs for an agent with mastery
of REDexp can we begin to make claims about necessitation.
Footnote 15 continued
my own. The strategy involves identifying a philosophical argument or position that implicitly assumes
that possession of a concept entails mastery. (This assumption is often masked by an ambiguity, between
possession and mastery, in the terminology of ‘‘understanding/possessing a concept’’). This assumption
undermines the position. Once we restrict attention to cases in which the assumption holds, the argument
fails to accomplish its goal. For example, I will argue (Sects. 9–11) that once we focus on cases in which
Mary has conceptual mastery, she can know the target experiential propositions.
16 For obvious reasons, the epistemic agent must have conceptual mastery of all concepts in the base
propositions as well.
17 The missing concept reply has appeared in the literature before (e.g. Hellie (2004), Loar (1990), Stoljar
(2005), and Tye (2000)). To the best of my knowledge, the ‘‘conceptual mastery’’ reply has not.
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7 The phenomenal concept strategy
We can delineate three different requirements on possession of an experiential/
phenomenal concept.
• Experiential requirement: Possession of an experiential concept requires having
had experiences that fall under the concept.
• Imaginative requirement: Possession of an experiential concept requires the
ability to imagine instances of the phenomenal quality that falls under the
concept.
• Recognitional requirement: Possession of an experiential concept requires the
ability to recognize experiences that fall under the concept as falling under the
concept.
Fans of the phenomenal concept strategy have endorsed versions of these
requirements, and others still.18 I deny them all; concept possession is too easy to
obtain.
Historically, defenders of so-called ‘‘phenomenal concept strategies’’ have
endorsed the experiential requirement on possession of a phenomenal concept.19
Mary has not experienced redexp and does not possess the concept REDexp. Since she
cannot consider the relevant propositions, her inability to know them demonstrates
nothing about physicalism. This strategy has been popular, but less than effective.
Once the possibility of possessing a concept without mastery, potentially through
deference to others, is recognized, the experiential requirement looks implausible.
Blind people, who have never seen redexp, can possess the concept REDexp. They can
truly think and say, ‘‘Tomatoes cause redexp experiences.’’ Ball (2009) and Tye
(2009) correctly press this objection against the experiential requirement and its use
against the knowledge argument.20 They point out that one can run a knowledge
argument in which Mary does possess the relevant phenomenal concepts, but in
which this possession will not help her learn the truths about experience (this is
effectively the version of the argument I considered at the beginning of Sect. 6).
Unfortunately, this move does not cut much ice. As argued in the previous section,
the epistemic capabilities of someone who merely possesses the concept indicate
nothing about necessitation, and hence cannot be brought to bear on the question of
18 Papineau (1998, p. 5) endorses the experiential requirement, writing that anyone ‘‘who has never seen
anything red cannot deploy a phenomenal concept of red visual experience.’’ Loar (1990) endorses the
recognitional requirement. For a good discussion cf. Stoljar (2005).
19 Papineau (1998) provides one example.
20 Ball (2009) and Tye (2009) use the term ‘phenomenal concept’ for any concept possession of which
requires having had experiences that fall under that concept. On this terminology, the experiential
requirement on possession of a phenomenal concept is true by definition. Ball denies that there are any
such concepts. But neither Ball nor Tye denies that there are experiential or phenomenal concepts in my
sense—concepts tied to looking like this (where a red patch is demonstrated). Ball and Tye also use the
term ‘phenomenal concept strategy’ for a response to the knowledge argument that endorses the
experiential requirement on possession of experiential/phenomenal concepts. I use ‘phenomenal concept
strategy’ more generally, applying it to any view that appeals to special features of experiential or
phenomenal concepts to explain how necessitation from the physical to the experiential is compatible
with a lack of epistemic implication.
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physicalism. Epistemic considerations involving agents with less than conceptual
mastery are simply a non-starter.
The experiential, imaginative, and recognitional requirements on concept possession
have obvious analogs for conceptual mastery. I do not bother to state them. All three
requirement are more plausible for conceptual mastery than for concept possession. One
can’t draw metaphysical conclusions from absence of epistemic implication unless the
epistemic agents have conceptual mastery. Thus, as a reply to the knowledge argument,
an experiential requirement on conceptual mastery of experiential/phenomenal
concepts can do all the same work as an experiential requirement on possession. But
the experiential requirement on conceptual mastery of REDexp is not subject to the Ball/
Tye-style criticism from deference. The original experiential requirement (on posses-
sion) looks bad because it’s clear that Mary can possess REDexp without ever having had a
redexp experience. On the other hand, it’s not obvious that Mary can have conceptual
mastery of REDexp without having had such an experience. I advise fans of the original
experiential requirement to transfer their allegiances to the experiential requirement on
conceptual mastery. It can do all the same work in replying to the knowledge argument
without incurring the obvious costs.21 Furthermore, once we distinguish between
concept possession and conceptual mastery, the conceptual mastery reply is a natural
extension of the original phenomenal concept strategy.
I neither endorse nor deny the experiential or the imaginative requirement on
conceptual mastery of experiential concepts. The experiential requirement seems
counterexample-able by a ‘‘swamp case’’. Take a conceptual master of REDexp. Imagine
an atom-by-atom duplicate, generated by erratic random forces in the swamp mist. It is
plausible that the duplicate will have conceptual mastery of REDexp despite never
having seen a red thing. Whether one can be a conceptual master of REDexp without
satisfying the imaginative requirement seems more questionable. However, one might
be willing to attribute conceptual mastery to creatures who lacked certain cognitive
imaginative capacities, but nonetheless had experienced redexp and were very reliable
in their redexp judgements.
Perhaps the requirements can be softened by including a clause about ‘‘normal
conditions’’—i.e. conditions that allow for exceptions involving erratic swamp
forces, genies, and fantastical neuro-surgery. Officially, I endorse only the
21 Alter (manuscript) replies to Ball (2009) and Tye (2009) in a similar way, and offers the same advice. He
also makes the important observation that the epistemic capabilities of mere possessors of a concept are not
good indicators of metaphysical necessitation. However, this observation plays a far less central role in his
discussion than in mine. Alter has his own version of the concept possession/conceptual mastery distinction.
He uses the terminology of possessing a concept under a ‘‘deferential’’ or ‘‘non-deferential’’ mode of
presentation. This terminology is misleading for two reasons. First, on the most natural extension of Fregean
modes of presentation to our current framework, concepts are modes of presentation. Talk of modes of
presentation of modes of presentation is misleading at best. Second, whether an individual defers to
someone else, in the sense of accepting correction regarding the use of his or her concept, is only a defeasible
guide to whether he or she has mere concept possession or mastery. One can use the term ‘deferential
possession’ as a technical term for ‘‘possessing a concept without conceptual mastery, in a manner similar to
Burge’s arthritis-man does’’. But if deferential possession is defined in this way, then there is an open
question about whether the fact that an individual defers, in the sense of accepting correction, implies
anything about whether he ‘‘deferentially possesses’’ the concept in the defined sense.
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recognitional requirement on conceptual mastery of experiential concepts.22
However, even without the experiential requirement on conceptual mastery, it
remains quite plausible that Mary does not have conceptual mastery of REDexp. Her
inability to know experiential propositions cannot be wielded against physicalism.
8 The informational assumption and the second horn
The second premise of the knowledge argument requires an inference of the
following type: ‘‘P does not implicate T, therefore P does not necessitate T.’’ The
contrapositive of this inference is: ‘‘P necessitates T, therefore P implicates T.’’ In
this section, we turn our attention to this contrapositive. I lay out the Informational
Assumption, which says that Mary can know every proposition necessitated by P .
The knowledge argument needs the informational assumption for two reasons. First,
the informational assumption provides the link between epistemology and
metaphysics on which the knowledge argument relies. Second, not making the
informational assumption hands the physicalist an easy reply to the knowledge
argument.
Suppose the informational assumption is false. Then there is some proposition R
(perhaps the proposition that the rate of inflation in Australia is increasing),
necessitated by P , that Mary cannot know. Suppose also that premise (1) of the
knowledge argument is true—despite complete physical knowledge, Mary can’t
know that tomatoes cause redexp sensations. The dualist wants to conclude that P
does not necessitate that tomatoes cause redexp sensations. But the existence of
exceptions to the informational assumption gives the physicalist an immediate
reply. She’ll say that the proposition that tomatoes cause redexp sensations is, like R,
one among many propositions that are necessitated by P yet not knowable by Mary.
To cut off this reply the dualist needs the informational assumption—there are no
propositions like R.
From here on, we make the informational assumption, and assume that Mary,
using her knowledge of P , can know every proposition necessitated by P .23 With
22 Disclaimer for the counterexample mongerers: I don’t endorse the crazy version of the recognitional
requirement. A conceptual master of BLUEexp need not be infallible in her blueexp judgements. If she is
drunk, temporarily mentally impaired, or some such thing, all bets are off.
23 There may be some exceptions to the informational assumption. For example, suppose dualism is true
and the experiential truths are not necessitated by the austerely physical state of the world described in P .
Let ‘Bob’ be a name whose reference is fixed by the description ‘the actual greenest thing in the
universe’. Suppose Bob is, in fact, a meadow in Vermont. It is plausible that the proposition BOB HAS
SURFACE AREA OF MORE THAN 10 M.2 is necessitated by P despite the fact that someone who knows P will
not (if dualism is true) be in a position to know it (because he or she will not be in a position to know the
experiential facts about greenexp). We seem to have a counterexample to the informational assumption.
The lesson is that the knowledge argument is compatible with the existence of some propositions that are
both necessitated by P and not knowable on the basis of P . Advocates of the knowledge argument must
hope that there are not too many exceptions to the informational assumption. Every exception opens up
space for the physicalist to reply to the knowledge argument with the claim that the proposition that
tomatoes cause redexp sensations is also an exception, and hence Mary’s inability to know it does not
demonstrate a lack of necessitation. Thankfully, the exceptions look to be of a special sort. Many of them
will contain rigidified descriptions involving phenomena not necessitated by the physical (e.g. dualistic
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the help of the informational assumption, we precisify the basic dilemma of this
paper.
The Dilemma: Either Mary does not have conceptual mastery of experiential
concepts, in which case we cannot draw any metaphysical conclusions on the
basis of what she can and cannot know, or Mary does have conceptual
mastery, and, with the help of knowledge allotted to her by the informational
assumption, she will be able to know all the relevant experiential propositions.
The dilemma is related to my claim that it is difficult to find a notion of epistemic
implication that satisfies both premises of the knowledge argument schema of Sect.
5. On the first horn of the dilemma, Mary lacks conceptual mastery, and we cannot
draw metaphysical conclusions from her case. On any notion of implication that
does not require epistemic agents to have conceptual mastery, premise (2) of the
schema is false. On the second horn, Mary has conceptual mastery. But this mastery,
in combination with the knowledge allotted to Mary by the informational
assumption, will generate an epistemic route to knowledge of experiential
propositions. On this horn, premise (1) of the schema is false—Mary can know.
I have already argued for the first horn of the dilemma. In the next three sections I
argue for the second horn. I demonstrate exactly how Mary’s conceptual mastery of,
e.g. REDexp, in combination with the informational assumption, yields an epistemic
route to knowledge that, e.g., tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
Advocates of the knowledge argument grant that the informational assumption
gives Mary knowledge of every proposition necessitated by P . But the dualist and
physicalist disagree about which propositions these are. The physicalist claims that
experiential propositions are necessitated; the dualist denies. In order to wield the
informational assumption against the knowledge argument, we must apply it only to
propositions the dualist admits P necessitates. I introduce a heuristic for determining
which propositions these are. To determine whether the dualist grants that P
necessitates a proposition, check whether the proposition is true at both the actual and
zombie worlds. The zombie world is an austerely physical duplicate of the actual world
that contains no experiential properties. Zombies walk the walk and talk the talk (they
even do zombie philosophy), but there is nothing ‘‘it is like’’ to be a zombie. 24
Our basic strategy is to play along with the dualist, using the zombie world to get
him to agree that certain propositions are necessitated by P , and thus knowable by
Mary. We then use Mary’s knowledge to refute the claim that Mary cannot know
that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
25 Consider some applications of the heuristic.
Rocks exist at both the actual and zombie worlds; the dualist grants that P
necessitates that rocks exist. By the informational assumption, Mary knows that
Footnote 23 continued
experiential properties). In this paper, the informational assumption will be brought to bear only on
propositions that are not of this special type. If the reader thought that many or most terms (or concepts)
were rigidified versions of phenomenal descriptions, then the informational assumption would not be of
much use. I assume this is not the case.
24 Chalmers (1996) deserves credit both for the invention of philosophical zombies and for bringing them
into the contemporary discussion.
25 Use of the zombie heuristic does not require that the zombie world be metaphysically possible.
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rocks exist. More interestingly, the dualist acknowledges that people in both the
zombie and actual worlds enter neural state N whenever they see a ripe tomato.
Thus P necessitates the proposition that a person enters neural state N whenever
they see a ripe tomato; Mary can know it. On the other hand, the dualist denies that,
at both the actual and zombie worlds, people experience redexp whenever they enter
neural state N. The zombie heuristic tells us we cannot assume, via the
informational assumption, that Mary knows this.26
9 Re-captured Mary
In order to draw metaphysical conclusions from what Mary can and cannot know,
we must insist that Mary has conceptual mastery of experiential concepts, including
REDexp. In the knowledge argument as originally described, Mary did not have such
mastery. But there is an obvious suggestion for how to proceed. If Mary did have
conceptual mastery of REDexp, would she be able to know the troublesome
experiential propositions?
Mary can acquire mastery of experiential color concepts if we remove her from
the black and white room and expose her to all the experiences that are necessary for
her to acquire conceptual mastery (e.g. experiences of red tomatoes, blue sky, green
grass, yellow lemons, etc.). Then bring Mary back to the black and white room and
give her a pill that makes her forget her expedition outside. Mary has now
experienced redexp sensations, has the ability to imagine redexp patches, and can
identify them as redexp (likewise for the other colors). But she does not (yet) know
that tomatoes cause redexp sensations. Prima facie, it seems Mary’s conceptual
mastery of experiential concepts will not help her come to know experiential
propositions. She’s got the color concepts, REDexp, BLUEexp, and GREENexp, and she
knows what experiences of each type are like. But she does not know how to map
these colors on to the world. She does not know which of these colors she can so
vividly imagine is caused by tomatoes and which by the sky. Thus, there may be
some propositions that Mary cannot know, despite her complete austerely physical
knowledge and her conceptual mastery. If so, perhaps the knowledge argument can
be salvaged.27
Which proposition is it, exactly, that Mary cannot know? Is it the proposition that
tomatoes cause redexp sensations? Mary can, with surprising ease, come to know this
proposition. She does not even need conceptual mastery of REDexp. Mary knows that
an overwhelming majority of English speakers who have seen tomatoes testify that
26 The zombie heuristic is fallible. A proposition might be true at both the actual and zombie worlds, but
false at some other world where P is true. Maybe there are exotic worlds at which P is true but rocks do
not exist. This is unlikely, but a proposition’s truth at the actual and zombie worlds does not guarantee its
necessitation by P . Here, we apply the informational assumption only to propositions that are plausibly
necessitated by P and granted by dualists as such.
27 The use of ‘‘re-captured Mary’’, or a version of Mary who has had the relevant experiences, is not new.
Versions appear in Lewis (1988), Nida-Rumelin (1996), and Stoljar (2005). I know of no use, other than
my own, of re-captured Mary as a method of enabling Mary to acquire conceptual mastery, rather than
possession, of experiential concepts.
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they cause redexp sensations.
28 This testimony seems perfectly sufficient for Mary to
learn that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
Perhaps the proposition that Mary cannot know is expressed by ‘redexp sensations
feel like this’ (or something similar). The knowledge Mary allegedly lacks is
sometimes stated this way. However, it is unclear what the ‘this’ stands for. If ‘this’
is a pure demonstrative, then it is no surprise that Mary cannot come to know that
‘‘redexp sensations feel like this’’. This proposition can only be known by someone
in the presence of a redexp experience. Just as one cannot come to know ‘‘this is a
chair’’ unless one is in the presence of a chair, one cannot come to know that ‘‘redexp
sensations feel like this’’ unless one is having a redexp experience. In the black and
white room, Mary is not having an occurrent redexp experience, so she can’t
consider the relevant proposition, let alone know it. This shows nothing about
necessitation.
Mary might imagine a redexp patch, demonstrate it, and consider the proposition
expressed by ‘redexp sensations feel like this’, where ‘this’ refers to the qualitative
feel of the redexp patch. But Mary, if she is a master of the concept REDexp, can know
this proposition. By the recognitional requirement, mastery of REDexp requires the
ability to identify such feels as redexp. If Mary is a master of REDexp, she knows that
the proposition expressed by ‘redexp sensations feel like this’ is true. If she does not
know that this proposition is true, then she can’t identify redexp sensations, and ipso
facto she lacks conceptual mastery of REDexp. Either way, the knowledge argument is
answered.
10 Wow: re-captured Mary redux
Mary’s epistemic route to knowledge that tomatoes cause redexp sensations,
sketched above, may not satisfy the reader. Reliance on the testimony of others
seems suspect, and irrelevant to the main thrust of Jackson’s original argument. We
can press the point by modifying the case.
As before, let Mary experience color sensations during a field trip outside the
black and white room. Drug her so she cannot remember which of the colors she can
now vividly imagine is the color of tomatoes, and which the color of the sky. Mary
retains the ability to imagine redexp patches. She introduces a term, ‘wow’, and an
experiential concept, wow, which applies to experiences with the qualitative feel of
redexp patches.
29 Mary plausibly has conceptual mastery of wow. She has
experienced wow sensations (otherwise known as redexp sensations), has the ability
to imagine wow patches, and can identify them as instances of wow (likewise for
the other colors). But Mary does not know which of tomatoes, the sky, or grass, is
28 Most speakers of English don’t distinguish between the concepts RED and REDexp. But this should not
impede Mary’s ability to learn from testimony that tomatoes cause redexp sensations. There’s an obvious
principle linking the two: red things cause redexp sensations.
29 I use the term ‘wow’ in deference to Perry (2001), who has a similar example, and introduces the
word.
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wow-colored. This time, Mary cannot rely on others’ testimony about ‘wow’—there
is no such testimony. If Mary cannot know that tomatoes cause wow sensations, the
knowledge argument looks to be in decent shape—there are still some propositions
Mary cannot know.
I argue that Mary can know that tomatoes cause wow sensations. The amnesia
pill ensures that Mary does not remember her expedition outside the black and white
room from the first-person perspective. But because Mary knows P and every
proposition necessitated by it, she knows all the details of her expedition from a
third-person perspective. She knows that she entered neural state N whenever she
saw a ripe tomato, strawberry, or fire engine, during that expedition. She knows that
whenever she imagines a wow patch while sitting in the black and white room, she
also enters neural state N. She’ll learn that N is the neural correlate of wow
experiences, and that tomatoes cause the instantiation of N. This information will be
sufficient for her to learn that tomatoes cause wow sensations.
11 Lonely Mary and the pincer argument
The reader may be worried about the preceding arguments. In Sect. 9, I argued that,
by relying on the testimony of others, Mary can know that tomatoes cause redexp
sensations. In Sect. 10, I argued that Mary can know that tomatoes cause wow
sensations (otherwise known as redexp sensations) by combining (3rd person) facts
about her expedition outside the black and white room with her capacity to imagine
wow-colored patches. Staunch defenders of the knowledge argument will deny that
having experienced redexp is a necessary condition on conceptual mastery of REDexp,
and also deny that the ability to imagine a redexp patch is required. To satisfy the
doubters, I argue that even in a Mary case in which (a) no one else ever exists, (b)
Mary never leaves the black and white room, (c) conceptual mastery of an
experiential concept does not require having had experiences of the appropriate
type, and (d) conceptual mastery does not require an ability to imagine the
experiential quality, Mary can still know the target experiential propositions, e.g.,
that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
Let Mary be the only person ever to have existed. She has complete knowledge of
P . But this time suppose that Mary has never left the black and white room, never
experienced redexp, and is (for whatever reason) unable to imagine a redexp patch.
But nonetheless she has conceptual mastery of REDexp, and (by the recognitional
requirement) would identify a redexp sensation, where she to have one, as an
instance of REDexp.
The pincer argument goes as follows:
(1) Mary can know that tomatoes cause her to think the thought THIS SENSATION IS R.
(2) Mary can know that the semantic value of the ‘R’ part of this thought is the
concept REDexp.
(3) If Mary can know that tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS R, and that




(4) If Mary can know that tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp,
then she can know that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
30
(5) Therefore, Mary can know that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
I briefly sketch the support for each premise here; then I go into detail. The
informational assumption ensures that Mary knows lot of facts about brain states
and about how those brain states relate to representational states, especially to the
syntax of those representational states. These facts will get Mary to the knowledge
attributed to her in premise (1). Mary will integrate knowledge about her brain state
at a time and knowledge about what she was thinking at that time to acquire the
knowledge premise (2) attributes to her. Premise (3) is obvious. Mary can know that
she is not in a deviant case, which is all that is needed to acquire the knowledge
attributed to her in premise (4).
Since Mary has conceptual mastery of REDexp, the recognitional requirement
entails that Mary is disposed to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp (not THIS SENSATION IS
BLUEexp) whenever she sees a ripe tomato. Mary learns that tomatoes cause her to
think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp by combining two bits of information. First, she’ll
learn that tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS R (premise (1)). Second,
she’ll learn that the semantic value of the ‘R’ portion of this thought is her concept
REDexp (premise (2)).
31 Premise (3) says Mary can combine these two pieces of
information in the obvious way.
The proposition that tomatoes cause Mary to think THIS SENSATION IS R is necessitated
byP . By the informational assumption, Mary knows it. Evidence for this necessitation
comes from considering the zombie world. Zombie Mary also thinks THIS SENSATION IS
R. The difference between Mary and zombie Mary is that Mary’s mental type ‘R’ has as
its semantic value REDexp, whereas zombie Mary’s ‘R’ means REDzombie. Actual
speakers and zombies both mean THIS, IS, and SENSATION by their uses of ‘this’, ‘is’, and
‘sensation’, respectively. The dualist should grant that these semantic facts are
necessitated byP , and grant thatP necessitates that tomatoes cause Mary to think THIS
SENSATION IS R.32 By the informational assumption, Mary can know that tomatoes cause
her to think THIS SENSATION IS R. Premise (1) is true.
To complete her epistemic route to knowledge that tomatoes cause Mary to think
THIS SENSATION IS REDexp, Mary needs only to learn that the ‘R’ component means
REDexp. The informational assumption ensures Mary knows the state of her own
brain at every moment in history, both past and future. She also knows how her
brain state relates to, and realizes, certain features of her representational or
intentional state. For example, the syntactic structure of Mary’s representational
30 The causation here must be of the appropriate type. For example, if tomatoes miraculously cause Mary
to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp whenever they strike her forehead, there is no reason to think that
tomatoes cause redexp sensations. I leave the qualification about causation implicit.
31 When I speak of ‘semantic value’ here, I mean (something like) Fregean sense, or meaning, not
extension. On this terminology, the semantic values of ‘this’ and of ‘Mary’ differ, even on an occasion
where a token of ‘this’ demonstrates Mary.
32 In Sect. 12, I address how the argument fares if the dualist denies that some of these facts are
necessitated.
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state is plausibly shared by zombie Mary, and necessitated by P . Therefore, Mary
knows the syntactic structure of her representational state at every moment in
history, and she knows which aspects of her brain realize which aspects of that
syntactic state. It follows that Mary knows exactly what brain state-type realizes the
‘R’ token-type of her representational state. Mary knows exactly at which moments
she has thought, and will think, an ‘R’ token, because she knows when her brain is
in the state that realizes the ‘R’ token.
Mary needs to figure out the semantic value of her ‘R’ tokens. To do this, she’ll
actively consider, at some time t, the thought ALL REDexp THINGS ARE REDexp. By the
informational assumption, Mary already knew that, at time t, two occurrences of
the ‘R’-element would occur in her brain’s ‘‘actively considering box’’ (an analog of
the belief box). Once Mary knows that at time t she thought ALL REDexp THINGS ARE
REDexp (and not THIS MANGO IS A SUCCULENT MANGO), she’ll learn that ‘R’ means
REDexp, and not MANGO, or BLUEexp. Therefore, premise (2) is true.
Premise (3) is obvious. It says that if Mary can know both that tomatoes cause her
to think THIS SENSATION IS R and that ‘R’ means REDexp, then she can know that
tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp.
Premise (4) says that Mary can infer from the fact that tomatoes cause her to
think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp to the fact that tomatoes actually cause redexp
sensations. To do this, Mary needs to check that she is not being misled in the
particular case of tomatoes. For example, if Mary applied the concept REDexp, for the
most part, to all and only redexp experiences, but misapplied to tomato-caused
blueexp sensations (perhaps because tomatoes trigger her allergies), then tomatoes
would cause Mary to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp without tomatoes actually
causing redexp sensations. Mary knows she is not in such a deviant case. She knows
that tomatoes, strawberries, and fire engines all emit light of wavelength 700
nanometers, have dramatically similar effects on the color processing component of
her visual system, and generate the same sensational neural correlate. She knows
tomatoes do not trigger an allergic reaction that causes her system to misfire and
label her experiences in a non-standard way. Premise (4) is true.
Premises (1)–(4) of the pincer argument are true, and the argument is valid. The
conclusion follows: Mary can know that tomatoes cause redexp sensations. By
combining (i) knowledge ‘‘from below’’ about brain states and the syntax of the
representational states those brain states realize (knowledge allotted to Mary by the
informational assumption) and (ii) knowledge ‘‘from above’’ about what thought
(ALL REDexp THINGS ARE REDexp) she was thinking at a given time, Mary can know that
tomatoes cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp.
33 From there, it’s only a short
step to knowledge that tomatoes cause redexp sensations.
33 The ‘‘pincer argument’’ gets its name from Mary’s two-pronged approach to knowledge that tomatoes
cause her to think THIS SENSATION IS REDexp. In military strategy, a simultaneous attack from two sides is




In this section, I consider six objections. The first two are objections to claims about
intentionality used in the pincer argument, the third is an objection to the
recognitional requirement on conceptual mastery of REDexp, the fourth and fifth are
objections to my presentation of the knowledge argument, and the sixth is an
objection to my story about the connection between conceptual mastery and the
modal rationalist inference.
One objection to the pincer argument says that the intentional facts I claim Mary
knows are not necessitated by P , and thus the informational assumption does not
give Mary knowledge of them—premise (1) is false. The important question here is
‘‘Are the intentional propositions needed by Mary to learn that tomatoes cause
redexp sensations necessitated by P ?’’ If the answer is ‘yes’, then these propositions
are, by the informational assumption, known by Mary, and the objection is
answered. The objector, a dualist, claims the answer is ‘no’.
One view that supports this objection claims that all intentional facts depend on
phenomenological/experiential facts—phenomenology is prior to intentionality.
Something like this view is suggested in Horgan and Tienson (2002), Graham et al.
(2007), and Strawson (1996). If this is correct, and zombies are possible, then there
is no intentionality at the zombie world, no representational states are necessitated
by P , and no intentional facts are knowable by Mary via the informational
assumption. However, the ‘‘phenomenology first’’ view couples badly with dualism.
If you believe that zombies are possible, you should believe that at least some
intentional facts are independent of phenomenal experience. Zombies appear to
utter sentences and think thoughts. At least some of these sentences and thoughts are
true, others false. If so, then at least some intentionality floats free of experiential
phenomenology. For example, it is very plausible that the syntactic form of
sentences, and of thoughts, does not depend on phenomenology, and thus does not
vary between Mary and zombie Mary. Furthermore, it is plausible that the meaning
of many terms, such as ‘is’, ‘that’, and ‘basketball’, does not shift between the actual
and zombie worlds. If these two claims are correct, then the pincer argument can
fend off the objection. That argument required only that P necessitates the
proposition that tomatoes cause Mary to think THIS SENSATION IS R. The dualist should
admit that enough intentionality is independent of phenomenology to make this
proposition true at the zombie world. If so, the proposition is plausibly necessitated
by P and knowable by Mary, as premise (1) claims.
The second objection, closely related to the first, claims that the meaning of
‘sensation’ varies between the actual and zombie worlds. Since zombies have no
phenomenal experiences, they mean something different by ‘sensation’. But I
claimed that ‘sensation’ has the same meaning in our mouths that it does in zombie
mouths. I reply that the claim that ‘sensation’ has the same meaning at the actual
and zombie worlds is inessential to the pincer argument. Even if the meaning shifts,
Mary can learn the meaning of ‘sensation’ using the same trick she used to learn the
meaning of ‘R’. By the informational assumption, she’ll know that tomatoes cause
her to think THIS S IS R. She can then use the method previously described (of
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thinking thoughts containing the concept REDexp, or SENSATION), to deduce that ‘S’
means SENSATION.
This reply offers a lesson and bolsters the reply to the first objection. The pincer
argument requires only that facts about the syntactic structure of Mary’s
representational states are necessitated by P (and thus knowable by Mary according
to the informational assumption). Once Mary knows she is thinking a thought with a
given syntactic form, and is able to re-identify mental language tokens as being of
the same type, she can use the familiar trick to determine the semantic values of
those tokens. It is tremendously plausible that the syntax of an agent’s language
(both spoken and mental) is necessitated by P and shared by Mary and her zombie
twin.
The pincer argument relies on the informational assumption and Mary’s
conceptual mastery of REDexp. Only the recognitional requirement on conceptual
mastery—not the experiential or imaginative requirement—is needed. Using only
the recognitional requirement gives the argument wider appeal. Deniers of the
experiential and imaginative requirements can be convinced. But the true skeptics
will remain doubtful. Why think that conceptual mastery of the experiential concept
REDexp (or WOW) requires so much? Why think that recognitional capacities are a
requirement on conceptual mastery of REDexp, or on experiential concepts in
general? I do not have a knock-down argument against the dedicated skeptic. I ask
the reader to consider a case, and consult his or her intuition.
Conceptual mastery is the type of understanding had by the proverbial ‘‘experts’’
to whom users who merely possess the concept, but do not have mastery, defer. The
thought contents of mere possessors are determined by those who have full-fledged
conceptual mastery. Imagine a case in which conceptual mastery of REDexp does not
require the ability to recognize a redexp experience as REDexp. Suppose we are all
blind, but use the concept REDexp, and defer in our use to the sighted master, whom
we call ‘Sensei’. The reference, content, and Fregean sense of our REDexp concept is
determined by Sensei’s. Sensei, when presented with three color sensations, one
redexp, one blueexp, and one greenexp, and asked, ‘‘which of these sensations is
REDexp?’’ will throw up his hands and say, ‘‘I have no idea!’’ Given that Sensei is the
ultimate authority here (he does not defer to further experts), it’s unclear what
makes the concept REDexp have redexp rather than blueexp sensations in its extension.
One way to ensure that REDexp refers to redexp sensations is to have the expert to
whom everyone defers identify redexp, and not blueexp, sensations as falling under
REDexp. Conceptual mastery is that which is had by the proverbial experts. The
experts regarding REDexp must be able to recognize redexp sensations as such;
otherwise they aren’t experts, and don’t have conceptual mastery.
An objector might disagree with my interpretation of the knowledge argument.
He or she might think that I’ve targeted the wrong propositions and claim that there
is some other proposition that Mary does not know. I disagree: there is no such
proposition. By the informational assumption, Mary has a tremendous amount of
information at her disposal. This information will allow her to know any proposition
you like, often by means similar to those I have outlined.
An objector might instead maintain that the knowledge Mary lacks is not
propositional. I have no beef with this claim. I maintain only that there is no
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propositional knowledge that Mary lacks.34 There are two reasons why proposi-
tional knowledge is what matters here. First, if the knowledge Mary lacks is not
propositional, it is difficult to see how her ignorance entails the falsity of the
physicalist’s necessitation claim. Necessitation is a relation between propositions
(or perhaps between states of affairs, which are easily translated into the language of
propositions). Second, the claim that the knowledge Mary lacks is not propositional
has historically been used as a physicalist defense against the knowledge argument,
not as a method of resurrecting the argument after losing the initial battle by
admitting that Mary lacks no propositional knowledge. Two examples of this
physicalist strategy include the ability hypothesis of Lewis (1988) and Nemirow
(1990) and the acquaintance hypothesis of Conee (1994).
Lastly, an objector might not buy my arguments regarding concept possession
and conceptual mastery. He or she might think that one can infer from an inability to
know, even for an agent who lacks the relevant concepts (or who lacks full-fledged
conceptual mastery), to an absence of necessitation. I think this line of thought
grossly mistaken; I have already explained why.
13 Taking stock
One upshot here is that Mary, sitting in her black and white room, bestowed with
conceptual mastery of experiential concepts such as REDexp, BLUEexp, and TICKLISHexp,
can know every true proposition involving those concepts. This is a tremendously
surprising result. It is worth noting that the result does not depend on the claim that
physicalism is true. Even if dualism is true, Mary will still be able to know the
experiential propositions.
My final position is very different than traditional phenomenal concept strategies,
and I do not think my view is deserving of the name or the lineage. All phenomenal
concept strategies accept that (a) Mary cannot know certain experiential truths on
the basis of the physical truths and (b) the physical truths necessitate these
experiential truths nonetheless. Special aspects of ‘‘phenomenal concepts’’ are then
wheeled in to explain how (a) and (b) could both obtain. Phenomenal concepts
explain how there could be necessitation from the physical to the experiential
without epistemic implication. My strategy is very different. I claim that once we
give Mary the conceptual capacities necessary to draw any metaphysical conclu-
sions, Mary will be in a position to know the experiential truths. Thus I deny the
datum (a) with which phenomenal concept theorists begin.
The most popular response to the knowledge argument is to deny the modal
rationalist claim that one can draw metaphysical conclusions about necessitation
from epistemological considerations. Phenomenal concepts supplement this
response. Special features of phenomenal concepts are wheeled in to explain how
there can be ‘‘opaque’’ necessitation—necessitation without epistemic implication.
34 More accurately, I claim that there is no propositional knowledge Mary lacks in a way that challenges
physicalism. There is no knowledge that Mary lacks for reasons other than lack of concept possession
and/or conceptual mastery.
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My response is much different. I’m ready to spot the advocate of the knowledge
argument his modal rationalism. Let’s assume that one can draw metaphysical
conclusions on the basis of some epistemological notion.35 Even then, I argue, we
can preserve our physicalism in the face of the knowledge argument. This gives my
account two dialectical advantage over most extant responses to the knowledge
argument.36
First, a modal rationalist can endorse my reply, and not most others. Second,
since most responses deny the modal rationalist connection between metaphysics
and epistemology, the debate quickly shifts into deep issues in the philosophy of
modality. With this shift comes the risk of devolution into a clash of basic intuitions
about links between modality, knowability, a priority, and conceptual truth. I avoid
the devolution by granting the modal rationalist his connections between
epistemology and metaphysics, while still offering the physicalist an adequate
reply to the knowledge argument.
Finally, I take pain not to overstate my position. Some philosophers, most
notably Chalmers (1996) and Jackson (1998), interpret the knowledge argument as
an attempted demonstration that there is no a priori implication from P to the
experiential truths. Have I demonstrated that there is such an a priori implication—
at least for a subject who has conceptual mastery? This question is difficult. The
answer depends on the relationship between a priori knowledge and introspection,
and whether certain types of introspection can yield a priori justification.
In the pincer argument, Mary used a four step procedure to figure out the REDexp
facts. First, by the informational assumption, Mary knew that tomatoes, fire engines,
and the like cause her to token ‘R’ representations. Second, she needed to determine
that Rs are REDexp representations and not BLUEexp representations. She did this by
actively thinking a thought involving the REDexp concept. At the moment she does so
her brain realizes a R token. From this she learns that R tokens are tokens of REDexp
(not of BLUEexp). Importantly, Mary had to actively consider a thought involving
REDexp at time t and use her knowledge that she considered that thought, and not
another, at t. This move is certainly introspective.
I cannot address here the difficult questions surrounding the relationship between
a priori justification and introspection. One move available to Chalmers, Jackson,
and others, is to define a notion of a priori justification that does not allow
introspection. They can then use Mary as evidence that there is no a priorino
introspection implication from the austerely physical facts P to the experiential facts,
and attempt to draw metaphysical conclusions. I admit that I have not shown that
there is an a priorino introspection route from P to the experiential facts, even if the
agent has conceptual mastery. However, this stipulative move does not resolve the
debate. The knowledge argument requires the existence of a link between epistemic
35 Of course, I’m not willing to spot the advocate of the knowledge argument any inference he likes.
Section 6 demonstrates that, if the modal rationalist claim that metaphysical conclusions follow from
epistemology is to have any chance of being true, we must insist that the epistemic agents have
conceptual mastery. The rationalist position I’m willing to play along with must acknowledge at least this
much.
36 Thanks to Ned Block for encouraging me to advertise this selling point and stress the differences
between my account and those already in the literature.
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implication and metaphysical necessitation. The a priori version of the knowledge
argument requires an important (potentially constitutive) link between a priori
implication and metaphysical necessitation. Defenders of the a priori knowledge
argument can stipulate whatever sense of ‘‘a priori’’ they like. But they are not free
to stipulate that it is a priorino introspection, rather that some other conception of the
a priori, that has the vital link to metaphysical necessity. This latter claim requires
argument.
For now, I leave it open (i) whether there is any notion of a priori implication that
allows the drawing of conclusions about necessitation and (ii) if there is such a
notion, whether it does or does not allow introspection. If it does not, then a strict
a priori version of the knowledge argument might survive my criticisms. In this
case, I will have shown only that there is an armchair implication from P to the
experiential facts. This result is itself significant. If the relevant notion of the a priori
does allow introspection of the relevant type, then I take my arguments to
demonstrate that there is an a priori implication from the complete physical facts P
to the experiential facts, and the knowledge argument is sunk.
14 Conclusion
The knowledge argument has a tough row to hoe. It requires a perfect storm of
epistemological and metaphysical conditions. It requires that Mary have the
experiences and capacities necessary to possess and master experiential concepts.
And the argument requires that Mary simultaneously be unable to know experiential
propositions and, by the informational assumption, able to know every proposition
necessitated by the complete austerely physical truth P . That’s a lot to require.
The informational assumption gives Mary a lot to work with—information about
the neural correlates of sensations, about what every human being has said
throughout the history of time, about the relationship between brain states and
intentional or representational states, and a tremendous deal more to boot. With
such a plethora of information, it is not difficult to figure out the experiential truths
themselves. Even in variations on the knowledge argument in which no one speaks
the word ‘red’, or in which Mary is the only person ever to have existed, Mary can
use the knowledge allotted to her by the informational assumption to figure out the
experiential truths.
We could continue doing variations on the argument, on Mary’s situation, and on
what proposition cannot be known, until the cows come home, but these basic
constraints remain. We cannot draw any metaphysical conclusions unless Mary has
conceptual mastery of experiential concepts. But once she has conceptual mastery,
Mary will be able to know all the experiential propositions she likes. She’ll know
about the redness of a ripe tomato, the greenness of a grassy field, and the brilliant
blue of a clear sky on a cold winter day. The knowledge argument is a beautiful and
provocative piece of philosophy. Jackson sketches a very promising line of anti-
physicalist attack. But when it comes to the details, it is surprisingly difficult to fill
in the sketch, and make good on Mary’s metaphysical potential.
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